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The SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. case,' representing
"a substantial departure from traditional standards of care and priori-
ties of duties for securities lawyers,"'2 may well be one of the most sig-
nificant cases on legal ethics in the history of the American legal
profession. Despite the specialized bar to which it is directed, its im-
pact is not limited to securities lawyers. Indeed, the significance of the
case is its potential effect on the lawyer's exercise of discretion in all
areas of practice. The true significance of the case can only be appreci-
ated when it it is viewed in light of both the traditional constraints on
the lawyer's discretion and the factors that have shaped the rules of
legal ethics for lawyers.
Constraints on the lawyer's exercise of discretion have tradition-
ally been determined by reference to the principle of loyalty to the cli-
ent.3 It is this principle that is used to justify the major rules of legal
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consultant to the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, but the opinions
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE; Discipli-
nary Rules and Ethical Considerations therein hereinafter cited only by DR and EC numbers].
1. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. The litigation resulted in several reported
opinions. See 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973); 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975); 68 F.R.D. 157
(D.D.C. 1975), a 'd, 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); 430 F.
Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1977); 73 F.R.D. 444 (D.D.C. 1977); 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). Consent
judgments were entered against various defendants at various times. See 457 F. Supp. at 687 n.2.
2. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers:An 4naysis ofthe New
Trend in Standards of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 421 (1974).
3. The lawyer owes "[e]ntire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the mainte-
nance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,-these are the
higher points, which can only satisfy the truly conscientious practitioner." G. SHARSWOOD, AN
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 78-80 (5th ed. Philadelphia 1884) (Ist ed. Philadelphia 1854)
(see note 14 infra). See Alabama State Bar Association Code of Legal Ethics Rule 10, 118 Ala.
XXVI (1897). It is interesting to note that "[t]he SEC traditionally took the position that, while
the securities lawyer had a duty to the investing public as well as to his client, his primary duty
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ethics, which deal with the duties to maintain the client's confidences
and to avoid conflicts of interest.4 Whether this principle of loyalty
developed as a result of these rules or vice versa, we cannot be sure. It
is most likely that the development of these ethical rules was originally
justified by vague reference to the principle of loyalty to the client that
only later took definitive form. This is at least a reasonable guess in
light of Wigmore's account of the development of the attorney-client
privilege.5 In any case the chronology is not particularly important.
The important point is that the principle of loyalty and the rules it
justifies are the product of three factors: the nature of the client, the role
of the lawyer, and the legal process involved. In the adversary system
of law administration, this naturally has meant that the rules of legal
ethics have developed in response to the concerns generated by the law-
yer, as advocate, representing an individual client in the judicial proc-
ess.
6
National Student Marketing posed a situation in which none of
these factors was present. The lawyers were not properly viewed as
advocates, the clients were not individuals in the common sense mean-
ing of the term, and the process in question was not judicial. The law-
was owed to his client." Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 415 (citing American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C.
1043 (1962)).
4. See CODE Canon 4 (confidences), Canon 5 (conflict of interest), and Canon 7 (loyalty to
client).
5. According to Wigmore, the privilege evolved over a long period of time, having begun
during the Elizabethan period as a privilege of the attorney. VIII J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290
(3d ed. 1940). It was limited at first to confidences "given for the purpose of securing aid in
litigation, and in the very litigation in which they were given." Id. § 2294 (emphasis in original).
The first stage of expansion was the extension of the privilege to other litigation; then it was
applied "to communications made in contemplation of a suit, or even after dispute had arisen
though not directly with a view to litigation." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). It
was finally extended to "communications made in seeking legal advicefor anypurpose .... " Id.
(emphasis in original). This was the development of the privilege when it belonged to the lawyer,
the privilege belonging to the client did not appear until the 1700s. That privilege "co-exist[ed]
with the older one for half a century," id. § 2290, and passed "more tardily through an independ-
ent though parallel development," until it was definitely recognized in its modem form in 1873.
Id. § 2294.
6. The single most influential writing on legal ethics in this country is probably Sharswood's
Essay on Professional Ethics, first published in 1854, in which he writes, "The responsibilities,
legal and moral, of the lawyer, arise from his relations to the court, to his professional brethren,
and to his client." G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 3, at 56. The following quote from Greenleafs
Evidence, in justification of the attorney-client privilege, is relevant to the point: "If such commu-
nications were not protected, no man . . . would dare to consult a professional adviser, with a
view to his defence, or to the enforcement of his right; and no man could safely come into a court,
either to obtain redress, or to defend himself." I S. GREENLEAF, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 238 (Boston 1842) (footnote omitted). The emphasis on the lawyer as advocate, of
course, is carried through in the Alabama Code of Legal Ethics of 1887, the ABA Canons of




yers in the case represented two corporations, National Student
Marketing Corporation (National Student) and Interstate National
Corporation (Interstate), in a merger transaction. The former was to be
the surviving company. Interstate's shareholders were to exchange
their shares for approximately 1,650,000 shares of National Student
stock. The proxy material sent to solicit shareholder approval of the
merger showed that National Student would have a $700,000 profit for
a nine-month period deemed of special importance to the merger trans-
action. Just before the merger was to be closed, however, National Stu-
dent's accountants submitted a comfort letter to the lawyers for both
companies that adjusted the company's earnings to show a net loss for
that period rather than a $700,000 profit. The lawyers declined to insist
that the contents of the letter be published or that Interstate's share-
holders be resolicited. Rather, the lawyers proceeded to consummate
the merger.7
This case is unique in our legal history in that the factors that
shaped the rules of legal ethics were not present in their traditional
form. Thus, the case can be distinguished, and if it were an isolated
phenomenon, it could be placed in its own pigeonhole to gather dust.
Far from being an isolated phenomenon, however, it is the most dra-
matic example of the current revolution in the law of legal ethics 8 to be
found in our case law. It is a case involving the right elements in the
right place at the right time, and it serves as an exemplar of the changes
taking place.9 Part of National Student Marketing's significance lies in
7. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
8. Only the term "revolution" adequately characterizes the developments in the law of legal
ethics in recent years, beginning with NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and continuing
through Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (legal services); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (legal services); United Transp.
Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (legal services); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (minimum fee schedules); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertis-
ing); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (solicitation); and In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation). In recognition of these and other developments, ABA President
William B. Spann in August 1977 appointed a Committee (later Commission) on Evaluation of
Professional Standards to consider what changes should be made in the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility adopted by the ABA House of Delegates only eight years earlier. See Pat-
terson, Wanted-A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639 (1977).
9. The National Student Marketing case was not a matter of chance. According to public
statements of various commissioners, the action was deliberately brought by the SEC to enlarge
the responsibilities of securities lawyers. Thus, in a widely quoted speech, Commissioner A. A.
Sommer, Jr., said:
I would suggest that all the old verities and truisms about attorneys and their roles are in
question and in jeopardy-and, unless you are ineradicably dedicated to the preserva-
tion of the past, that is not all bad.
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those when advocacy is clearly
proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of the auditor
than to that of the advocate.
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the fact that it reveals one of the better kept secrets of the legal profes-
sion: the lawyer exercises an enormous amount of power under the
guise of discretion to make decisions for the client, notwithstanding the
fact that the client in theory retains the ultimate power of decision.
Such a dramatic revelation of one of the mysteries of the profession
will inevitably result in an increased demand for lawyers to be held
accountable for the exercise of this power, and thus the limits of the
lawyer's discretion can no longer be measured solely by the principle of
loyalty to the client.
In the past, the general proposition was that what the client
wanted was what the client got, and the lawyer was comfortable in rely-
ing on the principle of loyalty to justify the exercise of whatever discre-
tion the desires of the client dictated. National Student Marketing
demonstrates that efforts to limit the principle by rules requiring that
the lawyer's loyalty, and thus his power of discretion, remain within the
limits of the law have been less than wholly successful. Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the disciplinary rules thereun-
der notwithstanding, the probability that most lawyers still perceive the
guiding principle to the exercise of discretion as loyalty to the client is
very high. 10
National Student Marketing thus runs counter to the mores of law-
yers in the representation of clients, for it is based on the importance of
the principle of candor to the tribunal, rather than loyalty to the client.
Most startling, perhaps, is that this decision implies that the principle of
candor is co-equal with the principle of loyalty to the client in resolving
ethical problems. Moreover, the case implies a principle of fairness to
opposing parties that also seems to rise to an equal status with the no-
tion of loyalty to the client.
The notion that the propriety of a lawyer's conduct is to be deter-
mined by reference to co-equal principles of loyalty to the client, can-
dor to the tribunal, and fairness to opposing parties represents a
breakthrough in the law of legal ethics that will almost inevitably
reshape the lawyer's responsibilities. While most persons may perceive
the development as a restriction of the lawyer's power of discretion, the
result may well be to reshape and enlarge that power, for National Stu-
dent Marketing means that the lawyer in the future must exercise a
degree of client control that has heretofore been deemed wholly incon-
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631, at 83,689. See Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 424-26.
10. The point is best demonstrated, perhaps, by the shock waves that the filing of the National
Student Marketing complaint sent through the securities bar. See Hoffman, On Learning of a
Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-the Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1390 n.4 (1978).
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sistent with the duty of loyalty to the client."
This new perception of ethical priorities will in many instances call
for the exercise of discretion in exquisitely difficult situations, for as
National Student Marketing makes clear, rules of ethics are no longer
interchangeable: the dictates of ethical rules will necessarily vary with
the circumstances of each situation. The measure of candor that is ap-
propriate for the lawyer in the role of courtroom advocate, for example,
is not necessarily appropriate for the lawyer in the role of adviser to a
client seeking administrative agency approval for conduct that will af-
fect thousands of members of the public.
Even though the rules are distinct for each situation, the principles
from which those rules are derived must be constant. The lawyer must
be loyal to the client in the administrative and private legal processes as
well as in the judicial process. The principle of candor to the tribunal is
relevant whether the lawyer is before a court, an administrative agency,
or an arbitration panel. The principle of fairness to others, including
the opposing party, is essential if we are to maintain integrity in the
administration of law.
The new approach to legal ethics presaged by National Student
Marketing thus requires a rethinking of the limits on the lawyer's con-
duct and the law of legal ethics. The purpose here is to examine some
propositions that may be relevant to the lawyer's exercise of discretion,
propositions that are not necessarily new, but that may have a new
meaning for the lawyer in, light of current developments. The first
proposition is that rules of ethics for the lawyer must be perceived as
legal rather than moral, mandatory rather than discretionary. The sec-
ond proposition is that the lawyer's rights and duties as lawyer when
representing a client in relation to others are derivative: they are de-
rived from the rights and duties of the client. The third and final prop-
osition is that the limits of the lawyer's discretion in any particular case
are determined by three factors: the nature of the client, the role of the
lawyer, and the legal process involved.
11. See, e.g., Commissioner Sommer's speech in which he stated:
[The lawyer] will have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfort-
able if he is also the close counselor of management in other matters, often including
business decisions. It means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to
the public who engage in securities transactions that would never have come about were
it not for his professional presence.
Sommer, supra note 9, at 83,689-90. Contrast this view with a classic statement of the lawyer's
duty of loyalty: "His loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master .... The lawyer's official
duty, required of him indeed by the court, is to devote himself to the client. The court comes
second by the court's, that is the law's, own command." Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN.
L. Rav. 3, 3 (1951).
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I. THE RULES OF ETHICS AS RULES OF LAW
Since the promulgation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
in 1969, the proposition that rules of ethics are legal, rather than merely
moral, is no longer subject to much debate in theory. 12 The notion that
the rules are discretionary rather than mandatory dies hard, however.
The implications of history, in the form of Hoffman's Ffty Resolutions
of the 1830s,13 Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics of the 1850s,14
the Alabama Code of Legal Ethics of the 1880s,15 and the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Ethics of 1908,16 are not to be so
lightly swept away by a document of the 1960s. Some doubt as to the
mandatory nature of ethical rules unquestionably remains in the minds
of most lawyers, a doubt that can have a debilitating effect at decision
time. Only a firm conviction that the "rule" requiring conduct argua-
bly contrary to human nature-such as a rule requiring a lawyer to
inform on a client with whom he has a fiduciary relationship-is law
will suffice to secure the consistent compliance of most lawyers. Had
the lawyers in National Student Marketing, for example, felt bound by
DR 7-102(A)(3) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
* . . (3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required
by law to reveal"), they would have saved themselves and their clients
much trouble. The proposition that rules of ethics are indeed law, then,
is worth examining.
Part of the problem in clearly perceiving ethical rules as legal rules
is that we place too heavy a burden on the term "ethics" by failing to
distinguish the types of conduct that are the proper subject of
mandatory rules. Thus, problems of the lawyer's conduct that we
freely characterize as unethical span a wide spectrum, ranging from
major violations of criminal statutes to minor breaches of rules of eti-
quette. Such a cavalier characterization is inappropriate. The lawyer's
violation of the criminal law is a breach of an ethical, professional duty
in much the same way that murder is a tort; the term "unethical" is a
12. "The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character.
The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall with-
out being subject to disciplinary action." CODE Preliminary Statement.
13. II D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. Baltimore 1836) (1st ed.
Baltimore 1817).
14. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 3. This work was originally published under the title "A
Compend of Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Profession of the Law, delivered before the
Law Class of the University of Pennsylvania." The lectures were first given in 1854.
15. The Alabama Code of Ethics was written by Thomas Goode Jones and first adopted by
the Alabama Bar Association in 1887. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 352 n.1 (1953).
16. The Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the House of Delegates of the American




very imprecise description of such conduct. The lawyer who embezzles
a client's funds or aids a client in a scheme to bribe a public official is
guilty of criminal conduct that raises no issues other than proof. Such
problems can better be characterized as spurious ethical problems, thus
avoiding any implication that they involve the lawyer's discretion.
They are matters to be dealt with legally but not to occupy much space
in the law of legal ethics.
At the other end of the spectrum are rules of manners, which are
more important than many may suppose. Courtesy is the balm that
often serves to soothe the frictions of human intercourse. The slight
that precludes a settlement can be expensive indeed. Rules of etiquette,
however, are genuine ethical rules only in the most subjective sense of
the term, for manners are not a matter of moral choice as much as they
are a reflection of personality.' 7
If we leave aside those situations involving crimes and manners,
there are two major kinds of ethical problems for the lawyer in the
representation of a client: those that arise out of interaction between the
lawyer and the client, and those that arise out of the lawyer's action for
the client in relation to others.
Most of the ethical problems arising out of the lawyer's interaction
with the client will not pose difficult problems. The lawyer has a duty
to be competent' 8 and to keep the client informed, and that is that. 19
Rules involving these duties arise directly from the obligations assumed
by the lawyer in agreeing to represent the client and are clearly proper
subjects for rules of law. The client's right to competent representation
and the right to be informed, and the lawyer's correlative duties to be
competent and to inform, are the ones least subject to compromise in
the law of legal ethics.
The hard problems are those in the second category, those that
result from the lawyer's action on behalf of the client in relation to
others. These problems present a wide variety of difficult issues that
range from the dramatic and tragic to the mundane and petty. In
Spaulding v. Zimmerman,20 for example, a rather old case, the lawyer
for the defendant in a tort action arising out of an automobile accident
faced a dramatic problem. Exercising commendable caution, he had
17. Rules of professional etiquette may, of course, take on substantive aspects. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, may be viewed as rules of professional etiquette for the
conduct of litigation.
18. CODE Canon 6 and DR 6-101.
19. Although the Code does not include a separate provision on the lawyer's duty of commu-
nication with the client, the duty is obvious. It will be the subject of a separate rule in the docu-
ment now being prepared by the Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards.
20. 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
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the plaintiff, a teen-age boy, examined by a physician of his own choos-
ing. Despite the fact that the plaintiff had been examined twice by his
own doctor, the defendant's physician discovered for the first time that
the young man had an aorta aneurysm, probably caused by the acci-
dent. The lawyer's choice was either to inform the plaintiff of the dan-
ger to his life and thereby increase the cost of settlement to the client, or
to keep quiet and save the client some money. He chose to keep quiet.
In People v. Belge,2t a more recent case with truly tragic overtones, the
lawyer representing a man charged with murder had, using informa-
tion gained from his client, sought and found the hidden body of the
young woman his client had killed. When the victim's father asked the
lawyer for information about his missing daughter's whereabouts, the
lawyer declined to answer. On a more mundane level, in Halloran v.
Blue & White Liberty Cab Co.,22 plaintiffs lawyer in a tort action,
thinking the defendant's business was incorporated, misnamed the de-
fendant as a corporation. His opponent answered the complaint with a
negative pregnant, thereby winning the case, if only temporarily.23 On
perhaps the most petty level, lawyers engage in widespread abuse of
discovery, including "the well-known tactic of producing volumes of
documents in studied chaos, either to burden the opposition or to in-
crease the possibility that a significant document will be overlooked
between the helter and the skelter."' 24 Does a lawyer have a duty to
turn over to the prosecutor real evidence of the client's guilt obtained
from a third party?25 Does the lawyer for the vendor of realty have a
duty to tell the vendee that his client is incompetent, and thus that the
transaction can be voided?26
If the practitioner views rules of ethics as moral rules rather than
legal rules, he perceives such problems as dilemmas. If the problem is
a dilemma he has discretion in solving it, and he may choose to do so
by means of an undesirable course of conduct. In fact, the duty of loy-
alty to the client encourages him to choose the undesirable course of
conduct if it might benefit the client. Thus, in the Spaulding case, the
lawyer chose to conceal life-threatening information because to reveal
21. 50 App. Div. 2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aj'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). For background on this case, see Comment, LegalEthics: Confidentialiy and
the Case of Robert Garrow's Lawyers, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1975).
22. 253 Minn. 436, 92 N.W.2d 794 (1958).
23. The case, involving approximately S1,000, was before the municipal court of Minneapolis
four times and the Minnesota Supreme Court twice over a five-year period. 253 Minn. at 437; 92
N.W.2d at 795.
24. Umin, Discovery Reform: A New Era or Business as Usual?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1050, 1052
(1979).
25. See Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978).
26. See Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975).
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it might have cost the client some money. Yet, at the time of the
Spaulding case, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Ethics provided,
"[T]he conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other lawyers
should be characterized by candor and fairness. ' 27 On the other hand,
the lawyer in the Belge case perceived his obligation to maintain si-
lence as mandatory rather than discretionary, for he was not relying on
an ethical "rule," but rather on the attorney-client privilege, clearly a
rule of law. While the result of this perception was undoubtedly dis-
tasteful, it was one mandated by law rather than encouraged by a de-
sire to benefit the client. It poses, therefore, a "dilemma" clearly
.distinguishable from that presented by the Spaulding case. In the Hal-
loran case, an inadequate perception of the legal quality of ethical rules
is again apparent as the lawyer in that case chose to take advantage of
his opponent's mistake even though it meant misleading the court and
abusing the judicial process in violation of then applicable Canon 22.
The difficulty that the lawyers faced in the Spaulding and Halloran
cases was that they believed they had no definitive rules of law to guide
them. In both instances they made the wrong decision, one that cost
their clients both time and money in more litigation and in final judg-
ment. The situation in the Be/ge case was different, and the lawyer's
decision not to reveal the information could be said to be correct in that
it was sustained. 28 The more interesting point, however, is that all
three cases involved essentially the same problem that the lawyer faced
in National Student Marketing: the problem of communicating infor-
mation detrimental to the client. Indeed, it is this issue that is almost
invariably at the heart of those ethical problems arising when the law-
yer is acting for the client in relation to another. Without the com-
mandment of a legal, as opposed to an "ethical," rule, the lawyer is
going to find it inordinately difficult to convey this kind of information
to another. The extent of this difficulty is made apparent by a reading
of Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 29
To recognize rules of legal ethics as rules of law, however, is not
sufficient. No matter how many ethical rules are made mandatory, the
27. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 22.
28. It is interesting to note that, despite its affirmance of the lower court's holding, the court
felt compelled to state: "We believe that an attorney must protect his client's interests, but also
must observe basic human standards of decency, having due regard to the need that the legal
system accord justice to the interests of society and its individual members." 50 App. Div. 2d at
1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
29. DR 4-I01(C), for example, provides: "A lawyer may reveal:. . .(3) The intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." The problem is the
permissive "may." The intent behind the provision apparently is to relieve the lawyer of the fear
of professional sanction if he does reveal the information in these circumstances. This interpreta-
tion, however, still leaves the lawyer with the discretion not to reveal.
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lawyer will still have to exercise discretion in the representation of a
client, for his basic function is to individualize the law for his client.
To exercise his discretion wisely, he must understand the limits of that
discretion. Helpful, if not essential, to this effort is an understanding of
the derivative nature of his rights and duties as a lawyer.
II. THE DERIVATIVE NATURE OF THE LAWYER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES
The climax in the National Student Marketing scenario was the
accountant's decision that the information showing a $700,000 profit
sent to the shareholders of both companies to secure approval of the
proposed merger was a mistake, and that instead the information
should have shown a loss for the period in question. Despite the poten-
tially critical importance of this information, disclosure was avoided
and the merger completed on the basis of inaccurate financial data.
In retrospect, this was a mistake, and the question is not where, but
why, the lawyers went wrong. Since the client did not have a right to
proceed in violation of the law, a reasonable guess is that the lawyers
failed to recognize that their rights and duties in acting for the clients
were derivative in nature, being dependent upon the rights and duties
of their clients. The proposition is one that is obvious on reflection, but
it is not one that has been given much thought.
The result in almost any case involving the propriety of a lawyer's
conduct in acting for a client turns on whether the lawyer was exercis-
ing a right of the client. Thus, in the Spaulding case discussed above,
the ultimate issue was whether the lawyer's client had a right to a court
approved settlement without revealing the information about the plain-
tiff s aorta aneurysm. In the Halloran case, the issue was whether the
lawyer's client had a right that the lawyer respond to the complaint
with a negative pregnant, and in the Belge case, the issue was whether
the client had a right that the lawyer keep his confidences.
The list could be extended indefinitely, particularly with cases in-
volving the attorney-client privilege, for this is one area in which the
proposition is manifest. The privilege belongs to the client, not to the
lawyer.30 The lawyer's right not to reveal under legal compulsion is
derived from the client's right not to reveal. The more interesting ques-
tion, however, is why this awareness of the derivative nature of a law-
yer's rights and duties has not been applied in analyzing other aspects
of the lawyer's conduct.
The answer must be that the notion of loyalty to the client has
30. See note 5 supra.
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been presumed to be the primary principle limiting the lawyer's con-
duct. The lawyer's relationship with the client has been deemed to be
the determining factor in ethically perplexing situations. However, if
we accept the proposition that the lawyer's conduct is guided by three
principles-candor and fairness as well as loyalty-it then becomes
clear that the lawyer has three, rather than one, relationships with
which to be concerned: the determining factors include his relation-
ships with the tribunal and with the opposing party as well as with the
client. This would seem to mean that the lawyer's duties result in con-
flicting rights for him. Thus, if the lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the
client, he seemingly has a right to be loyal to the client in preference to
his duty of candor to the tribunal. Similarly, his duty of candor to the
tribunal appears to give him a right to be candid to the tribunal in
preference to his duty of loyalty to the client. The same follows from
his duty of fairness to the opposing party, which seems to imply that he
has a right to exercise such fairness in preference to his duty of loyalty
to the client and his duty of candor to the tribunal.
This is confusion compounded, indicating that something is amiss.
What happens to the proposition that the lawyer is a representative of
the client whose primary duty is to protect the client's rights? The key
here is the phrase, "the client's rights." The fault of the above analysis
is the assumption that we are talking about the lawyer's rights and du-
ties as if they were independent of the client's rights and duties. The
fact is that the lawyer acts in a representative capacity-as an agent,
not as a principal-and that the rights and duties involved belong to
the principal rather than to the agent. Thus, when the lawyer is acting
for the client, his rights and duties in relations with others are deriva-
tive in that they are derived from the rights and duties of the client.
The fact that the lawyer's rights and duties are derivative does not
necessarily provide answers. The difficulty is that the rights and duties
of the client are not always clear. There may be no rules of law defin-
ing those rights and duties in a given situation, or if such laws do exist,
they may be ambiguous or even in conflict. If the latter situation is the
case, it is the lawyer's job to interpret those legal rules and to harness
the disorderly conduct of the relevant words. This undertaking, as well
as deciding in the absence of rules, calls for the exercise of properly
limited discretion.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE LAWYER'S DISCRETION
Discretion is the right to act autonomously within defined con-
straints. The constraints are not always clearly defined, however, and
when this is the case, ascertaining the limits of the lawyer's discretion
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involves two inquiries: What is the normal range of conduct permissi-
ble, and to what extent may, or should, the lawyer vary from that nor-
mal range of conduct?
A resolution of the first inquiry, even if wrong, obviates the neces-
sity of addressing the second. One can assume, for example, that the
lawyers in National Student Marketing perceived their conduct in pro-
ceeding with the merger as within the normal range of constraints,
which they no doubt measured in terms of loyalty to the client. They
were wrong. They did not realize their error, however, and thus did
not reach the second issue to ascertain whether there was a basis for
varying from the norm. The same is true of the Spaulding case, in
which there was in fact a basis for varying from the normal conduct of
not providing information gratuitously to the adversary. That basis, of
course, was the fact that the information might have saved the adver-
sary's life.
The range of normal conduct is determined in the first instance by
the law defining the rights and duties of the client. Due to the lack of
absolute certainty in the law, however, the rights and duties of the cli-
ent are sometimes determined by factors other than rules of law.31 This
is the lesson of EC 7-11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which reads:
The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelli-
gence, experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation
of a public officer, or the nature of a particular proceeding. Exam-
ples include the representation of an illiterate or an incompetent,
service as a public prosecutor or other government lawyer, and ap-
pearance before administrative and legislative bodies.32
As this language indicates, there are three factors other than the words
of any rule that are relevant in determining the rights of the client and
thus the constraints in the lawyer's discretion: the nature of the client,
the role of the lawyer, and the legal process involved.
31. Rules of law, of necessity, are general and thus cannot always be properly applied even if
the words of the law appear to dictate otherwise. This, of course, explains why the law contains so
many exceptions to the rules. Consider the rule that an agreement purporting to release a party
from liability procured by fraud may be set aside only if the consideration is tendered or returned.
In dealing with this issue, one court concluded:
A release procured by fraud will be set aside, without tender or return of the considera-
tion, when the releasor, because of conditions of poverty, is unable to meet the tender-or-
return requirement and the fraud remained undiscovered until after the consideration
had been expended or otherwise put beyond the releasor's control.
Vickers v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 534 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976).
32. See also EC 7-12: "Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapa-




A. The Relevance of the Nature of the Client.
The lawyer's first and foremost concern is the interest of the client,
and it is a truism that different clients have different interests. But we
can go further and say that different clients in similar situations have
different rights. The minor who enters into a contract, for example, has
different rights from an adult who enters into a similar contract.
Throughout the course of Anglo-American history, the law has distin-
guished persons in terms of legal rights and duties; these distinctions
are based on biological, economic, and sociological differences and
generally recognize conditions requiring legal rights beyond those ac-
corded the more fortunate.
To the extent that the positive law makes these distinctions, they
should present no problems for legal ethics; however, the rules of legal
ethics do not for the most part take the distinctions into account. The
paradigm of the client in the Code of Professional Responsibility is the
mature, competent, and self-sufficient adult, and it is only in the ethical
considerations, not the disciplinary rules, that there is any suggestion of
a distinction.33
There seem to be two reasons for this. One is that the law of legal
ethics is procedural, and it is procedural in a unique way. The lawyer
in acting for the client exercises, and can exercise, only procedural
rights of a client. He cannot, by definition, exercise the client's substan-
tive rights, unless, of course, the client gives him a power of attorney.
Whatever differences there may be in substantive rights, the uniformly
held presumption is that procedural rights must be uniform.
The second reason is that the lawyer is concerned with securing
and protecting the substantive rights of his client, and those rights, he
assumes, are determined only by rules of law. It is this assumption that
shaped the present Code of Professional Responsibility. But all rules of
law contain implicit limitations and extensions and are subject to inter-
pretation. Thus, the rights that a particular rule of law entails depend
upon the context in which the rule is applied, and the context always
includes the nature of the adversary. Consequently, the rights of one's
client may be limited by the rights of the party with whom the client
deals, despite the wording of a particular rule. The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is in error for failing to provide for this in its pro-
scriptions.
The adversary system militates against this position, for the correl-
ative duties it imposes remove the rationalization for the lawyer in pre-
33. EC 7-11 and EC 7-12 are not reflected in the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 7.
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paring one-sided adhesion contracts, 34 utilizing cognovit notes, 35 and
misusing jurisdictional statutes,3 6 to say nothing of refusing to correct
misleading proxy material. Nevertheless, the point is useful in distin-
guishing the normal constraints on the lawyer's conduct and the per-
missible variations from those constraints in the exercise of the lawyer's
discretion. The normal constraints are generally determined by the le-
gal rights of the client as defined by substantive law; permissible varia-
tions from those constraints are determined by variations allowed
under substantive law based on the nature of the client. Variations in
substantive law necessarily include consideration of the nature of the
person with whom the client is dealing.
The nature of the client thus has a direct relevance to the lawyer's
exercise of discretion. For that reason, it is helpful to categorize the
types of clients a lawyer may serve and to indicate briefly how, as their
character changes, the lawyer's ethical decisionmaking takes on differ-
ent dimensions. Apart from the mature, competent, and self-sufficient
adult, there seem to be three categories of clients whose representation
may create issues as to the scope of the lawyer's exercise of discretion,
justifying at times variation from the normal range of conduct. These
are the accused, the aberrant, and the artificial client.
The accused client--one charged with committing a crime-is a
special type of client who is given many special rights not accorded
civil clients. Such rights as the right against self-incrimination, the
right to testify, the right to counsel, and the right to confront one's ac-
cuser are called into play. There are times when the existence of these
constitutional rights places the lawyer in a quandary as to what he may
or should do, for example, in the case of client perjury. The question
posed by the prospect of client perjury is not whether constitutional
rights should prevail over statutory duties-e.g, whether the right to
counsel should prevail over the duty to testify truthfully-but rather
what the constitutional right actually entails. Must, or may, a lawyer
inform the court of the accused client's perjury? The question is not
made easier by its proper identification, and it is one to which different
courts have given different answers.37 This dilemma illustrates how the
34. See, e.g., Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279
(App. Div. 1975).
35. See, e.g., D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405
U.S. 191 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Tickle v. Barton, 142 W. Va. 188, 95 S.E.2d 427 (1956).
37. Compare McKissick v. United States, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968) and State v. Hender-
son, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970) with Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). See




nature of the client may influence a lawyer's ethical decisionimaking,
the factors relevant to that process being dictated purely by the unique
considerations pertaining to the criminally accused client.
Aberrant clients, the second category, are those under a disabil-
ity-e.g., the poor, the illiterate, minors, the mentally ill-whose disa-
bility distinguishes them significantly from the competent adult client
that is the model for the Code of Professional Responsibility. If he is to
represent such clients competently, the lawyer must have the discretion
to vary from the normal range of permissible conduct. There may, for
example, be occasions in which the lawyer must breach the client's con-
fidences, not only to protect the client but to protect others as well. The
lawyer whose client confesses to arson and confirms that he is a pyro-
maniac should not be precluded by the attorney-client privilege from
providing that client with help.
Of all the categories of clients, the one that presents the most com-
plex problems is the artificial client, the legal entity. The traditional
notion is that the legal entity is itself the client, 38 but it is surely concep-
tually difficult for a lawyer to consider a legal fiction as his client.
Rather, the lawyer for a corporation probably perceives the chief exec-
utive officer as his client and thus disregards the legal fiction. He may
do so at his peril, as National Student Marketing suggests, for the fact is
that the lawyer must serve the interests of the corporation.
When a lawyer is serving a legal entity, his duties and the proper
measure of his discretion vary in one major respect from when he is
representing a human client. When the lawyer is representing an indi-
vidual, the relationship is usually viewed as one of agency, with the
lawyer as the agent and the client as the principal who has the ultimate
power of decision. Formally, the relationship seems identical when the
lawyer represents an entity, but practically, when the client is a legal
entity, the client cannot exercise the power of decision; it can only de-
cide through agents. Thus in this situation the lawyer is an agent of a
client, but an agent who can deal only with other agents of the client.
Both the lawyer and the officers are agents of the corporation, and both
have fiduciary duties to the corporation.
The lawyer's relationship with corporate officials is a relationship
with them in their official, not their personal, capacities. In a sense the
corporate officials are derivative clients of the lawyer, since their enti-
tlement to the lawyer's services is derived from their corporate posi-
38. "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to
the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person
connected with the entity." EC 5-18.
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tions.39 This means that the lawyer's duties to the corporate officials
are determined by the officials' rights and duties as officials.
In the representation of a corporation, then, the lawyer has duties
to the corporation independent of those to the corporate officials. This
is one of the lessons of National Student Marketing. What those duties
are and how they comport with the lawyer's duties to corporate stock-
holders, officials, and employees is a matter of law. The crucial point is
that the individuals composing the corporate entity-the stockholders,
the directors, and the officers-are governed by two bodies of law, the
general law applicable to all and the special law applicable to them in
their corporate capacities. It is this special law that gives the lawyer the
discretion, indeed the duty, to vary his conduct when necessary from
that which is appropriate when the client is an individual.
B. The Relevance of the Role of the Lawyer.
The National Student Marketing case, by dealing with the lawyer's
traditional role of adviser in a nontraditional way, suggests that the
particular role of the lawyer is relevant in determining the limits of the
lawyer's discretion. The role of the lawyer reflects the extent to which
the client has delegated the care of his rights to the lawyer and is thus a
measure of the lawyer's responsibilities. The problem is that courts
have difficulty characterizing the roles of the lawyer beyond those of
adviser and advocate. Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith40 is a case
in point.
In Diversfied, plaintiff Diversified, having learned of the possibil-
ity of misconduct on the part of its employees, asked the law firm of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering to make an investigation and to report its
39. The term "derivative client" has been used to describe the situation in which two persons
other than the lawyer are involved. See, e.g., In re Dolan, 76 N.J. 1, 384 A.2d 1076 (1978):
The derivative client is the client whose representation by the attorney derives from his
participation in a transaction with the party who is the primary client of the attorney.
The derivative client is the client to whom disclosure is made and from whom consent to
the dual representation is sought.
Id. at 14 n.l, 384 A.2d at 1082 n.l (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Except
for the requirement of consent, a similar analysis would seem to apply when a corporate entity is
the client.
An analogous problem is that of a lawyer representing a trustee.
As a representative for the beneficiaries of the trust which he is administering, the trustee
is not the real client in the sense that he is personally being served. And, the benefi-
ciaries are not simply incidental beneficiaries who chance to gain from the professional
services rendered. . . . The trustees here cannot subordinate the fiduciary obligations
owed to the beneficiaries to their own private interests under the guise of attorney-client
privilege . . . . In effect, the beneficiaries were the clients of Mr. Workman [the attor-
ney] as much as the trustees were, and perhaps more so.
Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713-14 (Del. Ch. 1976) (emphasis in original).
40. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), rehearing en bane, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978).
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finding to the Board of Directors. The concern was for a slush fund
possibly used to bribe employees of customers, one of whom was the
Weatherhead Company which subsequently brought an action against
Diversified. In its action, Weatherhead sought to obtain the reports
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering made to the Board, a move that Diversified
resisted, even to the point of seeking a writ of mandamus to overturn a
district court order allowing discovery. The issue was whether the in-
formation fell within the lawyer-client privilege, and it turned upon the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between the law firm and Di-
versified. A sharply divided three-judge panel held that there was no
lawyer-client relationship; on the en banc rehearing, this ruling was re-
versed, again with a strong dissent. The issue turned on the role of the
law firm. Were the lawyers of the firm rendering legal services, or were
they acting merely as investigators in a nonprofessional capacity?
The majority opinion on the en banc rehearing stated: "Here, the
matter was committed to Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, a professional
legal adviser. Thus, it was prima facie committed for the sake of legal
advice and was, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear showing
to the contrary.' '4 1 The dissenting judge concluded: "I am satisfied that
Law Firm was not employed to provide legal services or advice. It was
employed to make a factual investigation and business recommenda-
tions in such areas as the results of the investigation might suggest.
And Law Firm did just that.' '42
The lawyer in Divers//ed obviously was not an advocate, and the
efforts of the court to characterize his role as that of adviser indicates
the influence the traditional roles of adviser and advocate continue to
have on the thinking of judges. In fact, the lawyer has long performed
other roles for the client. Thus lawyers have served not only as investi-
gators or legal auditors43 for their clients, but also as negotiators in
business deals,44 intermediators in resolving disputes between clients, 45
and private legislators in drafting legal documents. 46 Cases involving
these varied roles, however, have almost always involved the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege, and courts have based their deci-
41. 572 F.2d at 610.
42. Id. at 614 (Henley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. See, e.g., Metalsalts Corp. v. Weiss, 76 N.J. Super. 291, 184 A.2d 435 (Ch. Div. 1962).
44. See, e.g., Commercio E Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus., 19 F.R.D. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
45. See, e.g., Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977) (law-
yer permitted to represent both parties in an uncontested divorce); cf. Ishmael v. Millington, 241
Cal. App. 2d 570, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) (lawyer acted for wife at request of husband in divorce
action and was held liable to wife for not protecting her interests).
46. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (en banc).
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sions solely on whether the lawyer was also acting as legal adviser. If
he was, the privilege applies; otherwise the privilege may not be as-
serted.
Regardless of the policy considerations as to the applicability of
the attorney-client privilege, holdings based on such a narrow ground
are disturbing and possibly mischievous. They imply that the lawyer-
client relationship is a unitary one, and they give rise to significant
questions regarding the implications of this narrow view for the rules of
confidentiality and conflicts of interest generally. If the dissent in the
Diversifed case, for example, had prevailed, would Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering be precluded from suing Diversfted for another client in a
related matter? If a lawyer who negotiates a business agreement for a
client is held not to be acting as a lawyer, may he then sue the former
client for a breach of the resulting contract? To ask these questions is
to answer them, for even if the lawyer does not act as legal adviser or
advocate, the fact is that these relationships involve a significant inter-
action between the lawyer and the client.
The problem is thus one of more than theoretical interest; as the
disparate roles of the lawyer become increasingly identified and recog-
nized, they will become increasingly important as a factor in measuring
the lawyer's exercise of discretion, both for the lawyer and for the
court. Consequently, it may be helpful to re-examine the nature of the
lawyer-client relationship in light of these roles.
The traditional characterization of the relationship of the lawyer
and client as one of agency, with the client as the principal and the
lawyer as the agent, is sound as a general proposition. It is, however,
too simplistic; different roles of the lawyer make the agency designation
alone inadequate. When the lawyer acts as legal adviser, for example,
he is more like an independent contractor than an agent. He does not
act for the client in relation to others, but deals directly with him. This
distinction has important implications, providing as it does a separate
basis of responsibility for the lawyer. The liability of the lawyers in
National Student Marketing, for example, was based on the fact that
their role gave them independent responsibility for their actions sepa-
rate and apart from the wishes of the client. The other side of the coin
is that the designation may be important to the client if, for example,
there is a question of vicarious liability involved. Is the client liable on
the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior for the lawyer's defama-
tory statements made about the plaintiff in advising the client? At least
one case has held that the client is not liable, because the lawyer's role
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in advising the client was that of independent contractor.47
When the lawyer acts as advocate, he is an agent of the client, but
he is a special agent for a limited purpose48 who is not wholly subject to
the will of the client. As to tactical matters in a trial, for example, the
lawyer, not the client, has the right to make the decisions.49 Moreover,
as an officer of the court, the lawyer has duties to others than the client:
the duty of candor to the tribunal and of fairness to the adversary.
The nontraditional roles result in a different kind of relationship
that more nearly comports with the term "agent." As negotiator, the
lawyer fulfills all of the requisites of an agent since he is in effect a
surrogate for the client. When the lawyer acts as an investigator or
legal auditor, an intermediator, or a private legislator, however, his po-
sition takes on many of the characteristics of an independent contrac-
tor. Even so, the client in these situations retains the ultimate power of
decision; the lawyer's rights and duties in these roles are more directly
derivative of the client's rights and duties than those assumed in the
lawyer's role as adviser or advocate. Although the word "attorney"
carries much excess baggage, it is the most useful term to designate
these roles: an attorney is "an agent or substitute, or one who is ap-
pointed or authorized to act in the place or stead of another."50 The
word, however, has become too well identified as a synonym for law-
yer. The term "agent" in the sense of legal agent may thus be the most
appropriate, if not the most accurate, term to designate the capacity of
the lawyer in these roles. The term "agent" does serve to distinguish
the lawyer in fulfilling these functions from the lawyer as adviser or
advocate. More importantly, it provides the courts with a basis for
avoiding the fiction that no lawyer-client relationship exists in these
situations.
Distinctions between the various roles of the lawyer are to some
extent artificial. Occasionally the roles exist in isolation,5' but in most
cases the lawyer will serve the client as advisor and legal agent in vari-
ous capacities, and as advocate as well. To reject the significance of
distinguishing the roles on this ground is to miss an important point,
however: while the lawyer may serve in all the roles for a single client
47. Williams v. Burns, 463 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Colo. 1979).
48. "The attorney [as advocate] is in effect a special agent limited in duty to the vigilant
prosecution and defense of the rights of the client and not to bargain or contract them away."
Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 65, 119 N.W.2d 114, 116 (1963).
49. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. App. 1976).
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (5th ed. 1979).
51. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (investigator);
Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 194 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963) (adviser); Metalsalts
Corp. v. Weiss, 76 N.J. Super. 291, 184 A.2d 435 (Ch. Div. 1962) (investigator).
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at one time or another, he does not do so at the same time. Thus, the
important issue is the identification of the role played by the lawyer at
the time of the conduct in question. There is, for example, a significant
question whether a lawyer serving as courtroom advocate for an ac-
cused client should reveal the client's perjured testimony to the court,
thus precluding its admission into evidence; there is no question
whether the lawyer, acting as pre-trial adviser, may advise his client to
commit perjury.
C. The Relevance of the Legal Process.
The legal process in which the lawyer is engaged plays a signifi-
cant role in determining the outer constraints of the lawyer's power of
discretion. In the administrative process, for example, the lawyer may
have to provide information detrimental to the client that he would not
have to provide in the judicial process. Deciding what is proper in each
instance will certainly not be easy. An adequate test to determine the
appropriateness of lawyer conduct would seem to be whether, given the
functional purpose of the process involved, the proposed conduct will
corrupt the integrity of that process. The result in National Student
Marketing would appear to support the use of such a test. The conduct
of the lawyers in that case clearly violated the integrity of the adminis-
trative procedures of the Securities and Exchange Commission. As a
result, the lawyers' conduct was properly condemned.
The major ethical problem in relation to each legal process is that
of the lawyer's candor; the difficulty is in determining the limits of the
lawyer's duty to tell the truth. The key here is the concept of reliance.
In each of the legal processes with which the lawyer is concerned, a
different degree of reliance upon the lawyer's candor is reasonable.
The administrative process, for example, is a loosely structured, duty-
oriented process established for the purpose of administering law for
the benefit and protection of the public. In contrast, the judicial proc-
ess is a highly structured, rights-oriented process designed to provide
persons an institutional setting to resolve their disputes. The private
legal process, in further contrast, is an unstructured process that en-
ables citizens to make their own law, resolve their own disputes, and
give order to their private affairs without governmental intervention.
The notions of evidence and proof may be used to determine the
degree of candor appropriate to each of these three processes. Evi-
dence is a proposition of fact in partial support of a conclusion; proof is
a proposition in complete support of a conclusion. A proposition of
evidence, then, is meant to induce partial reliance; it is to be considered
along with other propositions in determining the proper conclusion. A
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proposition of proof, on the other hand, is in the form of the conclusion
itself and is intended to induce complete reliance. In the administrative
process, the information the lawyer presents to the agency takes the
form of proof, and the administrator must be able to rely on it.52 If, for
example, the lawyer for a client in the offering of securities gives an
opinion letter that the law has been fully complied with, the adminis-
trator must be able to rely upon that letter as proof of the matter stated
therein.
The judicial process presents an entirely different context. In this
setting the lawyer presents evidence, as opposed to proof, through the
agency of witnesses. Moreover, he presents evidence to a disinterested
trier of fact who will hear both sides of the issues, in accordance with a
large body of procedural rules. Furthermore, the evidence is subject to
testing by an adversary. As Professor Elliott Cheatham once said, the
lawyer in a trial has a duty to tell the truth and nothing but the truth,
but he need not tell the whole truth.53
The private legal process is both unique and comprehensive. It is
unique because it involves the delegation of a large amount of legal
power to private citizens. It is comprehensive because it involves as-
pects of the administrative, the judicial, and the legislative processes.
Whereas the institutions of the public legal processes are the adminis-
trative agency, the court, and the legislature, the institution of the pri-
vate legal process is the law office.
On balance, the private legal process is more analogous to the ad-
ministrative process than to the judicial process in terms of legal ethics,
since the integrity of the private legal process is almost wholly depen-
dent upon the integrity of the individual lawyer. The variety of the
lawyer's tasks in the private legal process amply illustrates the signifi-
cance of the notion of reliance in assessing the dimensions of a lawyer's
ethical decisionmaking. Indeed, the jobs undertaken by an attorney
within the private legal system compel us to look almost wholly to the
concept of reliance to determine the limits of the lawyer's duty to tell
the truth. In negotiating a settlement or a contract, for example, puf-
fing is the rule rather than the exception. The question in determining
the propriety of lawyer conduct is whether a statement is intended to
serve the purpose of proof in inducing reliance. It is one thing to char-
52. Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
53. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 86 (1971). Two caveats are in
order. One is that the lawyer cannot present a proposition of evidence he knows to be false. The
other is that the reasoning as to evidence does not apply to law. In citing cases and statutes to the
judge, the lawyer is presenting propositions in the form of proof to induce complete reliance, and
complete candor is required.
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acterize an offer as final; it is another to give a false statement as to the
amount of acreage the property contains. The former statement is
clearly recognizable as a negotiating ploy; the latter is a falsehood re-
garding an essential element of the agreement.
In dealing with the legal processes, however, there is an important
qualification. The administrative process includes judicial-type pro-
ceedings, the judicial process includes administrative components, and
the private legal process includes both administrative and judicial char-
acteristics. The workmen's compensation hearing, for example, nomi-
nally administrative in nature, is judicial in function; the uncontested
divorce and the probate of a will, nominally judicial in nature, are in
fact administrative. Even the ex parte hearing, an integral part of the
judicial process, is administrative in nature: it is only ancillary to litiga-
tion, with the lawyer presenting his petition as proof to induce reliance
by the judge without a presentation from an adversary. Even in the
private legal process, there are arbitration hearings, judicial in nature;
when a private attorney serves as the trustee of a trust, he is engaged in
an administrative task. Thus, it is important when using the legal proc-
ess as a measure of the lawyer's discretion to view the particular pro-
ceeding in functional rather than nominative terms.
D. The Needfor Greater Flexibility.
Recognition that the nature of the client, the roles of the lawyer,
and the legal process involved are relevant to the lawyer's exercise of
discretion provides greater flexibility in the law of legal ethics. The
flexibility is needed for lawyers engaged in the inordinately complex
task of administering law for clients under the triple burden of duties to
the tribunal and the adversary as well as to the client. At the same
time, recognition of the importance of the three factors also provides
the lawyer with more precise measures for determining the limits of his
discretion.
The three factors are always present and relevant, but they are not
determinative in every case. The normal adult client with an ordinary
legal problem presents the situation in which recourse to an analysis of
these factors is generally superfluous, as the problem can usually be
taken care of within the normal constraints of the lawyer's exercise of
discretion. It is in the unusual situation that it is necessary to go be-
yond the normal constraints and to search for the implications of each
of these factors. A simple example of such a situation is when the law-
yer acquires information about an adversary in litigation that is detri-
mental to his client but that may save the adversary's life.
What is clear from an analysis of any ethically perplexing circum-
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stance that a lawyer may face, beyond those matters that have been
referred to here, is that the rigidity of our shared perspective on legal
ethics is a severe detriment to adequate ethical decisionmaking. The
lack of flexibility in the law of legal ethics, a product of the notion that
ethical rules are fungible, means that the lawyer tends to deal with the
extraordinary situation in terms of the rules applicable to the ordinary
situation. He does keep the information about the adversary's condi-
tion to himself, even though disclosure could mean saving a boy's life.
Not appreciating the nature of the restraints on his discretion, he keeps
quiet and proceeds in the normal manner in this abnormal situation.
This above all else appears to be the central characteristic of our decid-
edly inadequate ethical thinking.
This shortcoming almost certainly was the basis of the problem in
National Student Marketing. The lawyers were not conscious of the
differences that having a corporate client, as opposed to a human client,
created in their obligations. They did not know that their roles as ad-
visers generated different obligations from those generated by their
roles as advocates. Finally, they were oblivious to the fact that the ad-
ministrative process implies measures of candor different from those of
the judicial process. The ultimate lesson of National Student Market-
ing, then, is that ethical rules are not fungible. The lasting value of the
case is that it may serve to help bring what lawyers consider extraordi-
nary dilemmas within the realm of the manageable, insofar as the exer-
cise of their discretion is concerned.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of legal ethics, by and large, is no better or worse than
other bodies of law. The laws of contracts and torts have their deficien-
cies, too. One major difference is apparent here, however: the law of
legal ethics is made by those whose conduct the rules are intended to
guide. This may explain why the pace of change in the law of legal
ethics has, until recent years, been glacial. One can surmise that it was
the suddenness as much as the substance of the National Student Mar-
keting case that caused so much furor.
The bar has survived the case so far, and it will continue to do so.
But National Student Marketing forecasts a change in the way in which
lawyers must approach and deal with ethical problems in the future.
The duty of loyalty to the client is no longer the sole criterion of ethical
decisionmaking, and no longer is it possible, as has so often been true
in the past, for lawyers to deal with ethical problems intuitively. The
standards of conduct for lawyers are fast becoming accepted as an inte-
gral part of the law in fact as well as in theory, and ethical problems are
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fast becoming subject to the same kind of analysis that lawyers have
long applied to problems of their clients.
The aim of this Article has been to suggest some ideas that may
aid the lawyer in analyzing ethical issues. In summary, the ideas are
that rules of ethics are rules of law rather than rules of morality; that
the solution to ethical problems is not in the rights and duties of the
lawyer, but in the rights and duties of the client; and, finally, that the
factors relevant to the determination of those rights and duties are the
nature of the client, the role of the lawyer, and the legal process in-
volved.
These are simple, and on reflection obvious, ideas, but they are
ideas that have been submerged under the notion of loyalty to the cli-
ent and lost in the undergrowth of ideas that surround the lawyer's role
as advocate. Once expressed, these obvious ideas may help to provide
the lawyer with a different and better perspective on his power and the
consequences of its exercise. There is, however, a significant obstacle.
People are convinced of nothing so much as they are convinced of their
ability to determine right from wrong, lawyers not excepted. Confi-
dence is a desirable quality, but such a universal conviction amounts to
a human frailty of which lawyers should be especially conscious and
careful, for obvious reasons.
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